Metrics and frameworks to quanti ably assess security measures have arisen from needs of three distinct research communities-statistical measures from the intrusion detection and prevention literature, evaluation of cyber exercises, e.g., red-team and capture-the-ag competitions, and economic analyses addressing costversus-security tradeo s. In this paper we provide two primary contributions to the security evaluation literature-a representative survey, and a novel framework for evaluating security that is exible, applicable to all three use cases, and readily interpretable. In our survey of the literature we identify the distinct themes from each community's evaluation procedures side by side and esh out the drawbacks and bene ts of each.
INTRODUCTION
As security breaches continue to a ect personal resources, industrial systems, and enterprise networks, there is an ever growing need to understand, "How secure are my systems?" is need has driven diverse e orts to systematize an answer. In the research literature, evaluation of information security measures has developed from three di erent but related communities. A vibrant and growing body of research on intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDS/IPS) has produced algorithms, so ware, and system frameworks to increase security; consequently, evaluation criteria to assess the e cacy of these ideas has been informally adopted. Most common methods require representative datasets with labeled a acks and seek traditional statistical metrics, such as true/false positive rates.
Analogous developments emerged from cyber security exercises, which have become commonplace activities for education and for enterprise self assessment. Scoring for red-team and capture-the-ag educational exercises are necessary to the framework of the competitions, and generally provide more concrete measures of security as they can accurately quantify measures of network resources, e.g., the time that a server was online or the number or records stolen.
More pragmatic needs for quantifying security arise at the interface of an organization's nancial and security management. Justifying security budgets and identifying optimal use of resources requires concise but revealing metrics intelligible to security experts and non-experts alike. To this end, intersections of the security and economic research communities have developed costbene t analyses that give methods to determine the value of security. As we shall see, the desired summary statistics provide a platform for quanti able analysis, but are o en dependent on intangible estimates, future projections, and lack semantic understanding.
While these sub-domains of security research developed rather independently, their overarching goal is the same-to provide a quanti able, comparable metric to validate and reason about the e cacy of security measures. is work delivers two primary contributions. First, we provide a representative survey of the security evaluation literature (Section 2). Works are chosen that collectively highlight the trends and landmarks from each subdomain (IDS evaluation, cyber competition scoring, economic cost-bene t analyses) allowing side-by-side comparison. We illustrate drawbacks and bene cial properties of the evaluations techniques.
Second, we propose a general "holistic" framework for evaluating security measures by modeling costs of non-a ack and a ack states. By holistic, we mean this approach is comprehensive in terms of the real-world factors that contribute to the overall models, and it is exible enough to satisfy all three use cases. Speci cally, it incorporates the accuracy and performance, which dominate IDS evaluation; the time to detection as well as the con dentiality, integrity, and availability of resources, favored by competitions' metrics; and the dollar costs or resources, labor, and a acks comprised by cost-bene t analyses.
Our model, described in Section 3, is a cost model that can be con gured for many diverse scenarios, and permits a variety of granularity in modeling each component to accommodate situations with ample/sparse information. Unlike many previous frameworks, ours uses a single, easy-to-interpret metric, cost in dollars, and is readily analyzable as each component of this cost uses a fairly simple model. As is commonplace for such economic models, nding accurate input values (e.g., maximum possible cost of an a ack, or the quantity of false alerts expected) is di cult and a primary drawback of our and all previous similar models (see Section 2.3). In response, we provide a sensitivity analysis is Section 3.3, to identify the model parameters/components that have the greatest e ect, so users know where to target e orts to increase accuracy-a practice that our survey reveals is unfortunately rare.
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We employ the new model in Section 4. As the driving force behind this research, we give a detailed con guration of our cost model to be used as the evaluation procedure for an upcoming IAPRA Challenge involving intrusion detection (Section 4.1). We provided simulated a ack and defense scenarios to test our scoring framework and exhibit results con rming that the evaluation procedure encourages a balance of accuracy, timeliness, and resource costs. We expect our simulation work to provide a baseline for future competitors.
Finally, as another example we con gure this new model to evaluate the GraphPrints IDS from our previous work [25] .
is example shows the e cacy of the evaluation model from many viewpoints. For researchers it provides an alternative to simple accuracy metrics, by incorporating the accuracy ndings and resource costs into a realistic, quanti able cost framework. is allows, for example, optimizing thresholds, accuracy, and performance considerations rather than just reporting each. From the point of view of a security operation center (SOC), we provide an example of how to evaluate a tool with the perspective of a potential purchase. Finally, we consider the model from a vendor's eye, and derive bounds for the potential licensing costs.
Overall, the main contributions of this work are (1) a survey of three distinct but related areas, and (2) a general framework allowing computation and comparison of security that satis es the needs of all three use cases with examples of how this metric can be used.
RELATED WORK: A SURVEY OF SECURITY EVALUATION
Our ndings from related work is that evaluation of cyber security measures has developed in three, rather independent threads. is section gives a survey of our ndings and strives to be representative of the main ideas in each rather than comprehensive in terms of citing every paper possibly related.
Evaluation of Intrusion Detection & Prevention Systems
In the intrusion detection and prevention research, which focuses on evaluating and comparing detection capabilities, researchers generally seek statistical evidence for detection accuracy and computational viability as calculated on test datasets. While such evaluations are commonplace, curation of convincing test sets and developing relevant metrics for e cacy in real-world use has proven di cult. e default metrics employed, such as computational complexity for performance and the usual accuracy metrics (e.g., true/false positive rate, precision, receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curve, and area under the curve (AUC) to name a few) are indeed important statistics to consider. Yet, these metrics cannot account for many important operational considerations, e.g., valuing earlier detection over later, valuing high-priority resources/data, or including the costs of operators' time. Research to incorporate these aspects is emerging, e.g. [18] , but still not does not incorporate all of these real-world concerns. O en the cost to implement the proposed security measures in operations, e.g., hardships of training the algorithms on network-speci c data or con guration/recon guration costs, is either neglected or considered out of scope.
Further, validation of a proposed method requires data with known a acks and enough delity to demonstrate the method's abilities. In general, there is limited availability of real network datasets with known a acks, and there is li le agreement on what qualities constitute a "good", that is, representative and realistic, dataset. is is exacerbated by privacy concerns that inhibit releasing real data, and unique characteristics inherent to each network, which limits generalizability of any given dataset. Notably, there are a small number of publicly available datasets, that have catalyzed a large body of detection research, in spite of many of these datasets receiving ample criticism. See Glass-Vanderlan et al. [19] for a list of datasets appearing in the research literature and a survey of IDS works by data type. In other cases, researchers o en use one-o , custom-made datasets,
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Iannacone, Bridges, & Long e.g. [25, 33] . While this can potentially address some of the concerns above, these datasets generally are not made publicly available, which sacri ces reproducibility of results, inhibits meaningful comparison across publications, and makes it di cult or impossible to verify the quality of these datasets.
2.1.1 DARPA Dataset. One of the earliest a empts to systematize this performance evaluation was the DARPA 1998 dataset, which was originally used to evaluate performers in the DARPA/ AFRL 1998 "Intrusion Detection Evaluation," a competition-style project. is dataset included both network and host data, including tcpdump and list les, as well as BSM Audit data. e test network included thousands of simulated machines, generating realistic tra c in a variety of services, over a duration of several weeks; this also included hundreds of a acks of 32 a ack types [39] . Interestingly, results were measured in "false alarms per day" (presumably the averaged per day in the dataset) not the raw false alarm rate (number of false positives / number of negatives).
is false alarm per day rate was compared with the true positive rate in percent. e authors chose this representation of the false alarm rate to emphasize the costs in terms of analysts' time; however, future researchers generally used the raw false alarm rate instead, since the two are directly proportional.
is was apparently the rst use of the ROC curve 1 in intrusion detection, which has since become a common practice. As the authors explain:
ROC curves for intrusion detection indicate how the detection rate changes as internal thresholds are varied to generate more or fewer false alarms to tradeo detection accuracy against analyst workload. Measuring the detection rate alone only indicates the types of a acks that an intrusion detection system may detect. Such measurements do not indicate the human workload required to analyze false alarms generated by normal background tra c. False alarm rates above hundreds per day make a system almost unusable, even with high detection accuracy, because putative detections or alerts generated can not be believed and security analysts must spend many hours each day dismissing false alarms. Low false alarm rates combined with high detection rates, however, mean that the putative detection outputs can be trusted and that the human labor required to con rm detections is minimized. is dataset has faced various criticism for not being representative of real-world network conditions. Some researchers have observed artifacts of the data creation, due to the simulated environment used to generate this data, and explained how these artifacts could bias any detection metrics [40] . Other researchers noted that high-visibility but low-impact probing and DoS a acks made up a large proportion of the a acks in the dataset [8] , giving them increased importance in the scoring, while other work has criticized the a ack taxonomy and scoring methodology [41] .
2.1.2 KDD Cup 1999 dataset & evaluation. e KDD Cup competition was based on the same original dataset as DARPA 98, but included only the network-oriented features and pre-processed them into convenient collections of feature vectors. is resulted in a dataset consisting essentially of ow data with some additional annotations. is simpli ed dataset was easier for researchers to use and spawned a large variety of works which applied existing machine learning techniques to this dataset [19] .
In the performer evaluation, the scores were determined by nding the confusion matrix (number of true/false positives/negatives) and multiplying each cell by a factor between 1 and 4. is weighting did penalize false positives for the "user to root" and "remote to local" a ack categories more heavily than other types of mis-categorization; however, this was apparently to compensate for the uneven sizes of the classes, and did not seem to consider any relative, real-world costs of false positives versus false negatives, as these costs were discussed in neither the task description nor the evaluation discussion. Other than these weights, the evaluation and the discussion of results placed no particular emphasis on the impact to the operator, like the DARPA 98 evaluation discussed above. Omi ing any ROC curves also seemed to be a step backwards, although understandable because not all submissions included a tunable parameter that this requires. Overall, the performers achieved reasonable results, but none were overwhelmingly successful. Notably, some very simple methods (eg. nearest neighbor classi er) performed nearly as well as the winning entries [16] .
Because it was derived from the DARPA dataset above, this dataset inherited many of the same problems discussed earlier. In particular, Sabhnani & Serpen [48] note that it was very di cult for performers to classify the user-to-root and remote-to-local categories:
Analysis results clearly suggest that no pa ern classi cation or machine learning algorithm can be trained successfully with the KDD data set to perform misuse detection for user-to-root or remote-to-local a ack categories.
ese authors explain that the training and testing sets are too di erent (for these categories) for any machine learning approach to be e ective. A er merging the training and test sets, they re-tested using ve-fold cross validation to observe that the same methods on this modi ed dataset resulted in vastly superior detection performance.
Other researchers released variants of this dataset to address some of these problems, such as the NSL-KDD dataset [54] , which removed many redundant ows and created more balanced classes. However, other problems still remain, and at this point the normal tra c and the a acks are no longer representative of modern networks.
Later Developments.
Following the release of these early benchmark datasets, researchers have generally focused on creating more recent and/or higher-quality datasets, and generally have not not focused on the methodology/metrics used in evaluation. Examples are the UNM dataset [44] of system call traces for speci c processes, the ADFA datasets [11] of Windows and Linux host audit data, and the VAST competition 2012 2 and 2013 3 datasets, which focus on various network data sources.
ere are many additional data sources which are now publicly available, but most are not suitable as-is for training and testing these systems. Some are more specialized datasets, such as the Active DNS Project [35] , many contain only malicious tra c, and some data sources are both specialized and malicious, such as only containing peer-to-peer botnet command and control tra c.
ere are much fewer examples of normal tra c datasets, although a few of them have been released, such as CAIDA's anonymized internet traces 4 . ese are generally either anonymized and/or aggregated in some way (eg. ows versus packets, modifying addresses, etc.) that can limit some types of analysis. More importantly, there is li le consensus on what "normal tra c" means, or what datasets would be representative of what networks. If these systems are deployed on networks with di erent characteristics than the evaluation datasets, the performance could di er signi cantly. Some works have proposed criteria which high-quality datasets should strive to achieve, but these are not universally accepted currently [49] .
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Because of these issues, current datasets can vary signi cantly in quality, and most are awed in some way. ere is currently no consensus on general-purpose benchmark datasets, the role which the DARPA and KDD datasets used to ll. is situation does seem to be gradually improving over time, but for now these remain signi cant issues.
2.1.4 CTU Botnet Dataset. One notable recent contribution presents both a new datasets, as well as a new methodology for evaluating IDS performance for detecting botnet tra c from PCAPs (packet captures) or just ows. [18] . e datasets contain a variety of individual malware PCAP les, collected over long time frames, and also some collections of (real) background tra c from a university network. In addition, the authors discuss some important shortcomings of the generally-used metrics, and propose some signi cant improvements. e classic error metrics were de ned from a statistical point of view and they fail to address the detection needs of a network administrator To address this, they propose new criteria:
• Performance should be measured by addresses instead of ows. is is important because, for example, one malware sample may generate much more command and control tra c than another, even while performing similar actions. is incidental di erence in behavior should not arti cially impact the detection scores.
• When correctly detecting botnet tra c, a True Positive, early detection is be er than la er.
ey de ne C T P as "A True Positive is accounted when a Botnet IP address is detected as Botnet at least once during the comparison time frame. "
• When failing to detect actual botnet tra c, a False Negative, an early miss is worse than la er.
ey de ne C F N as "A False Negative is accounted when a Botnet IP address is detected as Non-Botnet during the whole comparison time frame. " • e value of correctly labeling non-botnet tra c (True Negative) is not a ected by time.
ey de ne C T N as "A True Negative is accounted when a Normal IP address is detected as Non-Botnet during the whole comparison time frame. " • e value of incorrectly alerting on normal tra c (False Positive) is not a ected by time.
-C F P : "A False Positive is accounted when a Normal IP address is detected as Botnet at least once during the comparison time frame. " ey then use these to de ne the following time-dependent versions of the usual true/false positive/negative counts:
Here N c is the number of the "comparison time frames, " representing the relative time of the event; α is an adjustable time-scaling parameter; N b is the number of unique botnet IP addresses in the comparison time frame, and N n is the number of unique normal IP addresses in the comparison time frame. Finally, the time-respecting analogues of the usual metrics are as follows:
ErrorRate = tF N + tF P tT P + tT N + tF P + tF N (2g)
To summarize, detecting or failing to detect real botnet tra c (or other a ack tra c) is timesensitive, while for normal tra c it is not. Also, any number of alerts for ows that are related to the same address should be aggregated into one item for evaluation purposes, since the analyst is primarily concerned with the machine-level, and not directly concerned with the ow-level. Additionally, these authors de ne new time-based measures of FPR/TPR/TNR/FNR, Presicion, Accuracy, Error rate, and F1 score. ey provide a public tool to calculate these new scores [18] 5 .
2.1.5 Common Problems with ML Approaches. Sommer & Paxson [50] review the di culties in using machine learning in intrusion detection, and help to explain why it has been less successful when compared with other domains, such as optical character recognition (OCR). Some of the main issues they highlight involve the lack of quality training data, speci cally insu cient quantity of data, training with one-class datasets, and non-representative data causing signi cant problems. Additionally they re-emphasize some important practical issues, such as the relatively high costs of both false positives and false negatives, and the "semantic gap" referring to the di culty in interpreting alerts. All of these factors result in di culties in performing evaluations, with the simple statistical metrics of FP & FN rates being insu cient, and real-world usability being more important, but more di cult to measure. e authors emphasize that designing and performing the evaluation is generally "more di cult than building the detector itself. "
A common problem for intrusion detection metrics is the base-rate fallacy; e.g., see Axelsson [3] . Concisely, the base-rate fallacy is the presence of both a low false positive rate (percentage of negatives that are misclassi ed) but a high false alert rate (percentage of alerts are false positives, equivalently, 1− precision). e base-rate fallacy is o en caused by high class imbalance, usually orders of magnitude more negatives (normal data) than positives (a ack data). at is, the denominator of the false positive rate calculation is usually an enormous number; hence, for nearly any detector the false positive rate can be exceptionally low. is can give a false sense of success and it means that ROC curves are only in e ect depicting the true positive rate. On the other hand, the false alert rate, or simply quantity of false alerts are o en important to take into account.
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2.1.6 Evaluating Other Tools. Most of these works discussed above focus on IDSs speci cally, but these di culties also apply to IPSs, malware detection, and related problems. Similarly, these apply regardless of the data source or architecture being considered-host-based, network-based, virtual machine hypervisor-based, or other approaches.
Additionally, when evaluating other security-related systems, such as rewalls, SIEMS (security information and event management systems), ticketing systems, etc., we encounter even more di culty. Not only are there no widely accepted datasets, the relevant metrics and the testing methodology are o en not considered systematically. Some of these factors, such as the user experience, integration with current work ow and current tools, etc. are inherently harder to quantify, and are o en organization-dependent. e situation at present is somewhat understandable, but we maintain that a holistic approach to evaluation should help in addressing these areas as well.
Evaluation criteria for cyber competitions
Red team & capture-the-ag (CTF) competitions exercise both o ensive and defensive computing capabilities. ese activities are commonly used as educational opportunities and for organizational self assessment [14, 15, 43, 45, 46, 58] 6 . ese competitions require a set of resources to be a acked and/or defended and an evaluation criteria to determine winning teams (among other necessities).
In addition to traditional statistical evaluation metrics, the competitions integrate measures of operational viability, such as, the duration or number of resources that remained con dential, unaltered (integrity measure), or function (availability measure), in addition to statistical measures, e.g., true positive rate, etc. For example, Patriciu & Furtuna [45] list the following scoring measures for cyber competitions (for a ackers:) the count of successful a acks, accesses to target system, and number of successfully identi ed open services compared to the total number, an analogue true positive rate, (for defenders:) true positive rates for detection (identi cation) and forensics (classi cation), time duration to recover from an a ack, downtime of services.
While there is wide variety across competitions, the main trend in evaluation is to augment the usual detection accuracy metrics with some measure of how well an operation remained healthy and una ected. is greatly increases trust in the evaluation procedure because the e ect of the security measures on the operational objective are built into the metrics. We note that the object under evaluation is usually the participants' skill level, and signi cant e ort is needed to assemble the test environment. While cyber exercise publications o en focus on a combination of pedegogy, design, implementation, etc., we only survey the evaluation procedures. Below we discuss two works that give novel evaluation metrics for cyber competitions.
2.2.1 iCTF's A acker Evaluation. Doupé et al. [14] describes the 2010 International Capture the Flag Competition (iCTF), which employed a novel "E ectiveness" score for each a acker. For each service, s, and time t the binary functions C, D, OT , taking values in [0, 1], are de ned as follows: C(s, t) is a binary function that indicates criticality of service s at that time t; speci cally, it indicates if the function is in use for this application. D(s, t) encodes risk to an a acker, e.g., being detected, and in this competition was simply the opposite bit as C, punishing a acks on unused A Holistic Approach to Evaluating Cyber Security Defensive Capabilities 39:9 services. OT (s, t) is the indicator function for when C − D is positive and represents the "Optimal A acker". For an a acker a, A(s, t, a) ∈ [0, 1] represents the risk to service s by a acker a at time t. Toxicity is de ned as
a score that is increasing with the e ectiveness of the a acker. Note that toxicity (T ) is maximal when A = OT . Hence, the nal score is the normalized toxicity,
MIT-LL CTF
's CIA Score. Werther et al. [58] describes the MIT Lincoln Laboratory CTF exercise, in which teams are tasked with protecting a server while compromising others' servers. A team's defensive score is computed as
where (1) c is the percent of the team's ags not captured by other teams (con dentiality), (2) i is the percent of the team's ags remaining unmodi ed (integrity), and (3) a is the percent of successful functionality tests (availability). Weights W {c,i,a } allow exibility in this score. e o ensive score is O :=fraction of ags captured from other teams' servers, and the total score is
with parameter W d ∈ (0, 1) encoding the tradeo between o ensive and defensive scores. is is an appealing metric because it intuitively captures all three facets of information security-con dentiality, integrity, availability.
Cost-benefit analyses of security measures
ere is a robust literature that bloomed around 2005 providing quanti able cost-bene t analysis of security measures using applied economics. Arising from the tension between the operational need for security and the organization's budget constraints, these researches provide frameworks for quanti able comparison of security measures. e clear goal of each work is assisting decision makers (e.g., C-level o cers) in optimizing the security-versus-cost balance. To quote Leversage & Byres [37] , One of the challenges network security professionals face is providing a simple yet meaningful estimate of a system or network's security preparedness to management, who typically aren't security professionals. While many di erent models exist, overarching trends are to enumerate/estimate (a) internal resources and their values, (b) adversarial actions (a acks) and their likelihood, and (c) security measures' costs and e ects, then use a given model to produce a comparable metric for all combinations of security measures in consideration. is subject bleeds from academic literature into advisory reports from government agencies and companies [28, 31] , textbooks for management [21, 55] , and security incident summary costs and statistic reports [17, 27, 29] .
e main drawback is all proposed models rely on untenable inputs (e.g., likelihood of a certain a ack with and without a security tool in place) that are invariably estimated and o en impossible to validate. Academic authors are generally open about this as are we. Perhaps surprisingly, our survey of the literature did not identify use of sensitivity analysis to identify the most critical assumptions, a reasonable step to identify which inputs are most in uential, especially when validation of input assumptions is not possible. In response, for our model we provide such a discussion in Section 3.3.
A prevalent, but less consequential drawback is a tendency to oversimplify for the sake of quanti cation.
is o en results from unprincipled conversions of incomparable metrics (e.g., reputation to lost revenue), or requiring users to rank importance of incomparable things. e outcome is a single quantity that is simple to compare but hard to interpret.
User studies shows that circa 2006, many large organizations used such models as anecdotal evidence to support intuitions on security decision [47] .
e advantages are pragmatic-these models leverage the knowledge of security experts and external security reports to (1) reason about what combination of security measures is the "best bang for the buck", and (2) they provide a nancial justi cation required by chief nancial o cers to move forward with security expenditures [28] .
2.3.1 SAEM: Security A ribute Evaluation Method. Perhaps the earliest publication on costbene t analysis for information security, Butler [9] provides a detailed framework for estimating a threat index, which is a single value representing the many various expected consequences of an a ack. Working with an actual company, Butler describes examples of the many estimates in the work ow. Users are to list (1) all threats, e.g,. 28 a acks were enumerated by the company using this framework each in three strengths, (2) all potential consequences with corresponding metrics, e.g., loss of revenue measured in dollars, damaged reputation measured on a 0-6 scale, etc., and (3) the impact of each a ack on each consequence. Weights are assigned to translate the various cost scales into a uniform "threat index" metric; note that this step allows a single number to represent all consequences, but is hard to interpret. Next, the likelihood of each a ack is estimated, and the weighted average gives the threat index per a ack. e per a ack threat indices are summed to a single, albeit hard-to-interpret number. By estimating the e ect of a desired security measure on the inputs to the model, analysts can see the plot of costs for each solution versus the change in threat index. Notably, authors mention that uniformly optimistic or pessimistic estimates will not change rankings of solutions, and suggest a sensitivity analysis, although none is performed.
ROSI:
Return on Security Investment. Sonnenreich et al. [51] and Davis [13] discuss a framework for estimating the Return on Security Investment (ROSI). e calculation requires estimation of the Annual Loss Expected (ALE). Tsiakis et al. [56] provide three formulas for estimating ALE. One example is to let O i be the set of a acks, I (O i ) the cost of the a acks, F (O i ) the frequency of the a ack, and then ALE = I (O i )F (O i ). ROSI is a formula to compute the percent of security costs saved if implemented. It requires users to estimate the percent of risk mitigated M by the security measure and the cost of measure C. en the expected costs are ALE * M − C, and ROSI (the percent of cost returned) is (ALE * M − C)/C. ese authors expect estimate formulas to vary per organization, point to public cost-of-security reports, e.g., [27] to assist estimation, and suggest internal surveys to estimate parameters needed. ey go on to say that "accuracy of the incident cost isn't as important as a consistent methodology for calculating and reporting the cost", a dubious claim.
ISRAM:
Information Security Risk Analysis Method. Karabacak [34] introduces ISRAM, a survey procedure for estimating a ack likelihood and cost, the two inputs of an ALE estimate. For both a ack likelihood and a ack costs, a survey is proposed. Each survey question (producing an answer which is a probability) is given a weight, and the weighted average in converted to a threat index score, which is averaged across participants. e ALE score is the product of these two averages.
Gordon-Loeb Model.
Perhaps the most in uential model is that of Gordon and Loeb (GL Model), which provides a principled mathematical bound on the maximum a company should spend on security in terms of their estimated loss. See the 2002 paper [20] for the original model. Work of Gordon et al. [22] extends the model to include external losses of consumers and other rms (along with costs only to the private rm being modeled).
To formulate the GL model, let L denote the monetary value of loss from a potential cyber incident, the likelihood of that incident, and s(z) : [0, ∞) → (0, ] denote the likelihood of an a ack given z dollars are spent on security measures. Initial assumptions on s are that s(0) = > 0, s is twice di erentiable, and s strictly convex; e.g., s(z) = exp(−az) for a > 0 is a particular example. It follows that L is their ALE estimate. e goal is to optimize the expected cost, s(z)L − z for z positive. In the initial work Gordon & Loeb show that for two classes of s satisfying the above assumptions, z * :=argmin z (s(z)L − z), the spending amount that minimizes expected costs, satis es
at is, optimal security will cost no more than the 1/e ≈ 37% the expected loss of the a ack [20] ! Follow-on mathematical work has shown this bound to be sharp and valid for a much wider class of functions s [5, 36] . Speci cally, the work of Baryshnikov [5] is particularly elegant with mathematical results so striking they are worth a summary. Let X be the set of all security actions a rm could enact, Z (A) the cost of a set of actions A ⊆ X , and S(A) the likelihood of an a ack a er actions A are enacted. Baryshinkov assumes enactable collections of actions are measurable, and Z is a measure; this is a mild assumption and its real-world meaning is simply that the cost of disjoint collections of security actions will be additive, i.e., Z (A 1 ∪A 2 ) = Z (A 1 ) + Z (A 2 ). Next, S is also a set function with S(A) interpreted as the likelihood of an a ack a er actions A are enacted.
ere are two critical assumptions-(1) S(A 1 ∪A 2 ) = S(A 1 )S(A 2 ), so indeed u := − log S is a measure. (2) U is a non-atomic measure, i.e., any A can be broken into smaller U -measurable sets.
ese assumptions are made to satisfy the hypotheses of Lyapunov's convexity theorem (see [38, 53] ). Finally, set
the likelihood of an a ack given one has enacted the optimal set of security actions that cost less than z 0 . Lyapunov's theorem furnishes that the range of vector-valued measure (Z , U ) is closed and convex. e closedness, implies that for any z 0 (amount of money spent), the optimal set of counter measures exists, while the convexity can be used to show that the z * (the optimal cost) satis es the 37% rule (Equation 3)! is dizzying sequence of mathematics is striking because it starts with few and seemingly reasonable assumptions and proves the cost of optimal security is bounded by 37% of potential losses.
e conundrum of these results is they are deduced with no real-world knowledge of a particular organizations, security actions, costs, or a acks. While the assumptions seem mathematically reasonable, e.g. "s is convex" translates to "decreasing returns on investment (the rst dollar spent yields more protection than the next)", the result, the 37% rule, presupposes the solution to a critical question-that for any given dollar amount, z, the optimal security measures with cost less than z will be found. No method for nding an optimal set of measures is given or widely accepted.
Gordon et al. [23] focuses on "insights for utilizing the GL model in a practical se ing". Since the model is formulated as optimizing a di erentiable function, the optimum occurs when s = 1, or equivalently, the increment of spending in which the marginal likelihood of a ack is estimated at 1 is the amount to spend. Authors work with a company as an example, and the company is tasked with identifying resources to protect, the losses if each is breached, and change in likelihood for each $1M spent. In practice this model mimics the many other works in the area. e burden is on the company to estimate cost, likelihood, and e cacy of potential a acks and countermeasures, and then the reasoning is straightforward. On the other hand, the 37% rule gives an indicator if an organizations' security expenses are non-optimal. See Section 4.1 for an application.
Leversage & Byres' Mean Time to Compromise Estimate.
Research by Leversage & Byres [37] uses the analogy of burglary ratings of safes, which is given in terms of time needed for one to physically break into the safe, as a way to quantify security. Speci cally, the research seeks an estimate of the average time to compromise system. Network assets are divided into zones of protection levels and network connectedness is used to create an a ack graph using some simplifying assumptions, e.g., a target device cannot be compromised from outside its zone. A ackers are classi ed into three skill levels, and functions are estimated that produce the time to compromise assets given the a acker's level and other needed estimates, such as, average number of vulnerabilities per zone. Finally, a mean time to compromise can be estimated for each adversary level using the paths in the a ack graph to targets and estimated time functions. While this model still requires critical inputs that lack validated methods to estimate, the work addresses the problem of quantifying security in a di erent light. Unlike the other models discussed here, it embodies the fact that time is an extremely important aspect of security for two reasons: (1) e more adversarial resources are needed to successfully compromise a resource, the less likely they are to pursue/succeed; (2) e more time and actions needed between initial compromise and target compromise, the more chance of detection and prevention before the target is breached [29] .
2.3.6 Other works on quantifying security. Tangential to the three research areas discussed above are various researches and non-academic reports that address quanti ability of security.
Vendor and government reports are common resources for estimating costs based on historical evidence. Broad statistics about the cost and prevalence of security breaches are provided annually by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) [27] . More useful for estimating costs of a breach are industry reports that provide statistics conditioned on location, time, etc. [17, [28] [29] [30] [31] . Notably, Ponemon's Cyber Cost report gives the average monetary cost per record compromised per country per year-$225 & $233 per record in the US in 2017, 2018 respectively they report-an essential estimate for all economic models above. Further, Ponemon's reports that if the mean time to compromise (MTTC) was under 30 days, the average increase total cost was nearly $1M less than breaches with MTTC greater than 30 days.
Acquisiti et al. [1] seek the cost of privacy breaches through statistical analysis of the stock prices of many rms in the time window surrounding a breach. eir conclusion is short-term negative e ects are statistically signi cant, but longer term are not.
See Rowe & Gallaher [47] for results of a series of interviews with organizations on how security investments decisions are made (circa 2006). Anderson & Moore [2] provide a 2006 panoramic review of the diverse trends and disciplines in uencing information security economics.
Verendel [57] provides a very extensive pre-2008 survey of researches seeking to quantify security, concluding that "quanti ed security is a weak hypothesis". at is to say, the methods proposed lack repeated testing resulting in re nement of hypotheses and ultimately validation through corroboration.
NEW EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
Our goal is to provide a comprehensive framework for accruing security costs that can be exible enough to accommodate most if not all use cases by modeling and estimating costs of defensive and o ensive measures modularly. By design the model balances accuracy of detection/prevention capabilities, resources required (hardware, so ware, and human), timeliness of detection/containment of a acks. Viewed alternatively, the model permits cost estimates for true negative (not under a ack), true positive (triage and response costs), false negative (under a ack without action), and false positive (unnecessary investigative) states.
Our approach can be seen as adopting the same general cost-bene t framework as the works in Section 2.3, and incorporating the more speci c metrics described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 to address the other two use cases, namely IDS evaluation and competition events. Consequently, we rely on many of the same cost estimates as the works in Section 2.3, which does present some practical di culties, especially when estimating probability or costs of an a ack; however, these di culties in estimation are unavoidable, and we provide estimates for costs based on research to be used as defaults in Section 3.4.
Our general approach for evaluating the impact of any technology or policy changes is to estimate the change in the total cost (C Total ) by estimating the costs of breaches ( C Breach i ) and the cost of all network defenses (C Defense ). is approach can be applied to a wide variety of technology or policy changes; however, in this discussion we are primarily considering the case of IDS evaluation. e costs of network defense (C Defense ) can be considered a combination of labor costs C L and resource costs C R .
e a ack cost, C Breach i is analogous to the Annual Loss Expected (ALE) following Section 2.3, with the di erence being that C Breach i covers an arbitrary time period, and can include actual or estimated losses (e.g., cost due to data les stolen). Note that these breach costs include both direct costs (monetary or intellectual property losses) as well as less direct losses such as reputation loss, legal costs, etc. Defense costs C Defense include all costs of installing, con guring, running, and using all security mechanisms and policies. While e ective defenses will primarily reduce the number of breaches expected, e ective incident response will primarily reduce the impact (and therefore the cost) of any speci c breach C Breach i , so both approaches would be expected to reduce C Breach i , at the cost of somewhat increasing C Defense . e defense cost includes both resource costs and labor costs. Both of these will generally include up-front as well as ongoing costs. Ongoing costs can vary over time, and can depend on adversary actions, because analysts will be reacting to adversary actions when detected.
When comparing IDSs, we want to consider the total costs of all candidate systems, meaning the defense costs C Defense of the IDS, plus the projected breach costs C Breach i above. A typical analysis might compare a baseline of no defenses, (meaning C Defense = 0 and maximal C Breach i ,) versus current practices, versus new proposed system(s). e total costs (C Total ) will be positive in all cases, but successful approaches will minimize this total.
For a simple example, incorporating an enterprise-wide policy that all on-network computers must have a particular host-based anti-virus alerting and blocking system will incur an upfront licensing fee, costs of hardware needed to store and process alerts, labor costs for the time spent installing and con guring, time spent responding to alerts, and a constant accrual of costs in terms of memory, CPU, and HD use per host per hour. However, these C Defense costs will presumably be o set by a reduced C Breach i . Estimating all of these costs included in C Defense is relatively simple, however estimating C Breach i is more di cult. Speci c examples for using the model for such evaluations are the topic of Section 4.
is section de nes and itemizes a ack and defense costs in Subsections 3.1 & 3.2. We strive for relatively ne-grained treatment of costs (e.g., breaking a ack cost models into kill-chain phases), permi ing one to drill down into costs if their data/estimates permit detailed analysis, or to stay at a more peripheral level and model with coarser granularity. e section concludes with our estimates for quantifying the main components in Subsection 3.4.
A acks and Breaches: Definition and Cost Model
Beginning with the familiar triad of con dentiality, integrity and availability, we de ne a "breach" as any successful action by an a acker that compromises con dentiality or integrity. In principle, a acks against availability could also be considered, but ignoring them at present simpli es the discussion below. is also ts with the common understanding among practitioners, where loss of availability (e.g., due to a DDoS a ack) is generally considered much less severe, and may be handled primarily by the network operation center (NOC) instead of the security operation center (SOC) [12, 32] .
Building on this, we consider an "a ack" to be a series of actions which, if successful, will lead to a loss or corruption of data or resources. e a ack begins with the rst actions that could lead to compromising con dentiality or integrity, and the a ack ends when these are no longer threatened. For example, an a acker may re-try a failed action several times before adapting or giving up, and this would all be considered part of the same a ack. An a ack can potentially be thwarted by both automated tools and manual response of the SOC.
If each a ack were instead viewed as one atomic event, this type of reaction by network defenders would not be possible within that framework; however, real a acks almost always involve a sequence of potentially-detectable a acker actions. For example, the "cyber kill chain" model [26] describes a seven-phase model of the a acker's process, beginning with reconnaissance, continuing through exploitation, command and control, and ending with the a acker completing whatever nal objectives they may have. At that point, the breach is successful. As the authors describe:
e essence of an intrusion is that the aggressor must develop a payload to breach a trusted boundary, establish a presence inside a trusted environment, and from that presence, take actions towards their objectives, be they moving laterally inside the environment or violating the con dentiality, integrity, or availability of a system in the environment. e intrusion kill chain is de ned as reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, command and control (C2), and actions on objectives.
e authors later describe how this model can map speci c countermeasures to each of these steps taken by an adversary, and how this model can be used to aid in other areas such as forensics and a ribution.
Other authors have expanded this kill chain model to related domains such as cyber-physical systems [24] or proposing related approaches based on the same insights [10] . e creators of the STIX model discuss this kill-chain approach in some depth when presenting their STIX knowledge representation [4] . ey de ne a "campaign" as "a set of a acks over a period of time against a speci c set of targets to achieve some objective. "
Our de nitions of "a ack" and "breach", discussed above, is a simpli ed view of these same pa erns. In this case, the speci c sequence of actions is less important than the general pa ern: an "a ack" consists of a series of observable events, which potentially leads to a "breach" if successful.
e events that make up an a ack can be grouped into "phases", where one phase consists of similar events, and ends when the a acker succeeds in progressing towards their objectives. An example would be dividing the a ack into seven phases corresponding to the kill chain above; however, we generally make no assumptions about what may be involved in each phase, only that they occur sequentially, and that succeeding in one phase is a prerequisite for the next.
3.1.1 Breach Costs Model, C Breach . e general pa ern for the a ack is that each phase incurs a higher cost than the previous phase, until the maximum cost is reached when the a acker succeeds. Within each phase, the cost begins at some initial value, then increases over time until it reaches some maximum value for that phase. Consider an a acker with user-level access to some compromised host. Initially, the a acker may make quick progress in establishing one or more forms of persistence, gathering information on that compromised system, evaluating what data it contains, etc. However, over time the a acker will maximize that system's value, and will need to move on to some other phase to continue towards their objectives. e cost versus time for any phase of the a ack can be seen in Figure 1 , and can be represented by the equation C phase (t; a, b, α) := b/(1 + c exp(−αt)), where c = b/a − 1 with a the starting cost at t = 0, b the maximal cost (limit in time), and term α determines how quickly this maximum cost is approached. In the worst case, where α is relatively large, this cost versus time curve is approximately a step function.
Because an a ack is composed of several of these phases, if we assume that each phase is more severe and more costly than the previous, we can view the cost versus time for the a ack overall as seen in Figure 2 . is can be represented by a sum of the cost of all phases, which using the equation above would be C Breach (t) = C phase i (t − t i ) with phase i beginning at time t i . As t increases, this will approach the maximum cost for this breach.
is model is cra ed to give exibility based on the situation. In cases where we have su cient data on a real a ack, this approximation maybe unneeded, and one can replace the curves above with observed costs for each phase. On the other hand, when estimating cost of a general a ack without speci c cost versus time data, we propose two options. First, one may consider estimate each phase's cost as constant and estimate the a ack as a series of steps (e ectively le ing each phase's α → ∞). Secondly, one may ignore phases and approximate the total cost of the a ack as an S-curve, such as b exp(−α/t 2 ), where b denotes the maximal cost of an a ack over time, and α controls how fast the a ack cost approaches b. See Figure 3 . is second approach is useful when the total cost of a breach can be estimated, but the individual phases of an a ack either cannot be modeled well, or are not the primary concern. An example of this may be when estimating future breach costs for planning purposes. Intuitively, this cost estimation gives a marginal cost of 2αb exp(−α/t 2 )/t 3 , a skewed bell curve. is matches the expected costs for a common a ack pa ern, beginning with low-severity events such as reconnaissance, reaching maximum marginal cost as the a ack moves laterally, ex ltrates data, or achieves its main objectives, starting with the most important objectives if possible. Over time, a er the main objectives have been completed, and the maximum cost is being approached, the a ack will again reach a lower marginal cost simply because few or no objectives remain. To view this another way, this model captures the common sense view that a acks should be stopped as early as possible, and that stopping an a ack a er it has largely succeeded provides li le value. Interestingly, modeling a particularly slow-moving a acker, or a particularly fast one, can be achieved by varying α. In practice one would t the two parameters to their data/estimates. Examples are given in Section 3.4.1 and 4.1.
Defense Cost Model
We break defense cost into labor and resource (e.g., hardware) costs, denoted C L , C R , respectively,
Both the labor costs and resource costs can be sub-divided into several terms for easier estimation. ese can represented as a sum of the following:
• initial costs, C I , covering initial install, con guration, and related tasks,
• baseline costs, C B , covering ongoing, normal operation when no alerts are present,
• alert triage costs, C T , representing the cost of determining if an alert is a true positive or a false positive, • incident response costs, C IR , representing the costs of responding to a real incident a er it is detected and triaged.
is can be summarized as the following equations:
3.2.1 Labor Cost Model, C L . Labor costs of analyst time and other technical sta time are a signi cant cost for many organizations. If there is any noticeable cost or productivity impact to the end user, this must also be included. is could include reduced productivity from machine slowdowns, AV false positives incorrectly deleting needed les, false positives in web or DNS ltering blocking useful sites, or any downtime needed to respond to real incidents. ese costs can be sub-divided as described above, into initial costs, baseline costs, triage costs, and incident response costs, which allows the labor costs to be related directly to the sensor behavior and the status of any a acks. See Table 1 with functional models to accompany descriptions below.
e initial labor costs, C I L , covers any initial installation, con guration, and all related tasks such as creating/updating any documentation. is also includes any the costs of any required training for both analysts and end users. e baseline labor costs, C B L , covers normal operation when no alerts are present. is would include any patching, routine re-con guration, etc. is would also include any possible impact on the end user from normal operation, such as updating credentials, maintaining two-factor authentication, etc.
e alert triage labor costs, C T L , represents the cost of determining if an alert is a true positive or a false positive. In principle this could apply to both analysts and end users; however, generally end users will not be involved in or aware of this process, so in those cases that would not contribute to costs. Note that the time needed to triage any alerts can depend signi cantly on their interpretability. For example, an alert giving "anomalous flow from IP <X>, port <x> to IP <Y>, port <y>" would be less useful than "Unusually low entropy for port 22(ssh), this indicates un-encrypted traffic where not expected". 
Notation (Cost)
Analysts End Users e incident response labor costs, C IR L , represents the costs of responding to a real incident a er it is detected and triaged. e actual cost of this can vary over a large range, but we can make many similar observations as in Section 3.1.1-the a ack can be considered a series of discrete events, grouped into phases of escalating severity and cost, and that each phase reaches some maximum cost before potentially advancing to the next phase. Overall, we can model the costs of incident response with a sigmoid function, similar to the a ack costs model: C IR L (t) = b exp(−α/t 2 ), with parameters α, b t to incident response costs data if available. Like the a ack costs model, if we have data from an actual observed a ack, we then no longer need this model, and can calculate this cost directly from available information. e incident response will primarily impact the analysts and other sta responding directly; however, some incidents may impact users as well, for example due to re-imaging machines, or due to network resources being unavailable during the response. e impact on users can either be calculated based on real event data, or predicted using a similar model as the analysts' incident response costs.
Resource Cost
Model, C R . Resource costs are another signi cant component of overall costs of network defense. ese can be broken down similarly to the labor costs above, into initial costs C I R , baseline costs C B R , triage costs C T R , and incident response costs C IR R . As shown in Table  2 these resource costs can also be sub-divided by resource type. is speci city helps in estimating costs and in relating costs to IDS performance and a ack status.
e sub-categories of resources considered include the following:
• Licensing -In most cases this will either be free, xed cost, or a subscription based cost covering some time period. However, this also could potentially involve a cost per host, cost per data volume, or some other system. is will be a signi cant cost in many cases.
• Storage -is is one of the easier costs to estimate; this increases approximately linearly with data volume. is will generally be a function of the number of alerts generated, or a function of time if more routine information is being logged, such as logging all DNS tra c.
• CPU -e computational costs of analysis, a er data is collected, will (hopefully) scale approximately linearly with the data volume. is cost can vary based on algorithm, indexing approach, and many other factors.
is is a function of time, and does not generally depend on number of alerts, unless considering some process that speci cally ingests alerts, e.g., security information and event management (SIEM) systems. ere are additional costs of instrumentation and collecting data, for example capturing full system call records will impose some non-trivial cost on the host. Most end-users are not CPU bound under normal workloads, so this cost is minimal as long as it's under some threshold. In a cloud environment, this may be included in their billing model, or if self-hosting this will reduce the ability to oversubscribe resources, so in either of these cases the costs will be more direct.
• Memory -ere is some memory cost required for analysis and indexing. is is generally a function of time, or in some cases a function of the number of alerts. ere is also some memory cost for collection on the host. Like CPU costs on the host, most physical machines are over-provisioned, so costs are minimal if under some threshold. In a cloud environment, this will typically be a linear cost per time.
• Disk IO -ese costs are generally a function of time and/or a function of the number of alerts. is cost is not a major concern until it passes some threshold where it impacts performance on either a server or the user's environment.
• Bandwidth -Like Disk IO, these costs are a function of time and of the number of alerts.
is is also not a major concern until it passes some threshold that causes performance degradation.
• Datacenter Space -While in practice this is a large up-front capital cost, it would typically make sense to consider any appliances as 'leasing' space from the datacenter. Optionally, the rate set may account for how much of the datacenter's capacity is currently used, so that space in an underutilized datacenter is considered a lower cost. In commercial cloud environments, this is not a directly visible cost, but is included in other hosting costs.
• Power and Cooling -ese costs are similar to the costs of datacenter space discussed previously, except that representing the costs as a function of time is more direct. In most cases this is not a major concern, but it could be in some cases, and is included for completeness.
Initial costs C I R would primarily consist of licensing fees and hardware purchases, as needed. Hardware purchases and related capital costs, such as datacenter capacity, can be either included in the initial costs or averaged over their expected lifespan, which would be captured in the baseline costs C B R . Either is acceptable, as long as they are not over-or under-counted.
Baseline costs C B R represent the cost of normal operation, when no alerts are being generated. is may include licensing costs, if those are on a subscription basis. is also would o en include storage, CPU, memory, datacenter costs, and related costs, in cases where hardware costs are amortized over time, or in cases where cloud services are used, and these resources are billed based on usage. is case is what is shown in Table 2 .
Alert triage costs C T R represent costs of servicing and triaging alerts, above the baseline costs of normal operation. is is potentially a labor-intensive process, but generally imposes li le or no direct resource costs in terms of CPU, memory, etc. e amount of storage and bandwidth needed for each alert is extremely small, and is not signi cant until alert volumes become much higher than analysts could reasonably handle. ere are some exceptions, such as large volumes of low-priority alerts, or unusual licensing arrangements, so these costs are included for completeness.
Incident response costs C IR R represent the costs of actually responding to a known a ack. Like the triage costs, this is labor-intensive, but involves li le or no direct resource costs outside of highly unusual circumstances. is is included here simply for completeness.
Full Model & Parameter Analysis
Combined, these give the following:
As with all cost-bene t models, the primary downfall is estimating input parameters; e.g., populating C Breach (t) requires estimating the full impact of a future breach over time, an inherently imprecise endeavor. While we give some defaults and examples for many of the estimates in Sections 3.4 and 4, here we give a broad overview of sensitivity of the model to the parameters allowing users to target estimation e orts to those inputs that are most in uential.
Terms C I R and C I L are constants; hence, unless for some particular situation they are very large, they will not cause large e ect when estimating costs over long time spans. Ongoing costs, C B L and C B R are linear, increasing functions of time. ese will generally have a greater e ect than the constant one-time costs. In some cases these can be an outstanding contributor, but for most applications we expect them less in uential than a ack, triage, response costs.
Triage costs, C T L and C T R , are linear, increasing functions of the number of alerts, and incident response costs, C I R L and C I R R are linear, increasing functions of the number of incidents and their cost. ese are potentially very in uential on the nal costs. We note importantly that hidden variables are the false positive and true positive rates/quantities. e nal costs of a security measure can vary widely with quantities of alerts and the accuracy of detectors, so these terms are very in uential. is is supported by our examples where costs incurred by the quantity of false positives drastically vary overall costs.
Finally, C I R L and breach costs (a ack models) are potentially non-linear in time. Consequently, they are the most in uential parameters, along with hidden parameters "how o en do we expect to be a acked?" and "what type of a acks do we expect?" As a quick example, the Ponemon's 2018 Report [30] gives statistics for breach costs, but also separate gures "mega breach costs" with the di erence being two orders of magnitude in cost. Changing an a ack or response model based on these two di erent estimates could potentially change total costs on the order of $100M! In summary, for most applications, estimates of a ack, incident response and triage costs will be most in uential parameters. Importantly, estimating these requires latent variables such as true/false positive rates, which are in turn very in uential.
3.4
antifying Costs When cost data or information on the e ects of actual a acks are available, the cost model's parameters can be computed relatively precisely. When this data is not available, such as when evaluating a new product or scoring a competition, general estimates are available using prevailing wage information, cloud hosting rates, and similar sources. To aid in application of the model, this section provides examples and reference values for the cost models introduced earlier in the section.
3.4.1 Breach costs. e costs of breaches ( C Breach i ) can be estimated based on historical data, data aggregated from other organizations, and an estimate of the value of the data being protected. For example, if a single host is infected with ransomware, it may simply need to be re-imaged, and the cost of this may be simple to estimate from labor costs to reimage a host (assuming that no data was ex ltrated as part of the a ack). If a more advanced adversary can in ltrate the network, and they persist for long enough to nd and ex ltrate valuable data, the cost of the breach rises dramatically a er the adversary begins to steal data. Modeling costs of such an a ack will require estimates of the worth of the data in the organization and/or can rely on historical reports of similar breaches.
Using reports on breach costs from 2018, we provide an example of how to estimate an S-curve model (Section 3.1 of costs induced by an a ack. Ponemon's Institute provides a yearly report giving statistics on data breach costs and related statistics [29] [30] [31] . From the 2018 report we nd " e mean time to identify [a breach] was 197 days, " and containing a breach in less than 30 days resulted in an average $3.09M cost, while containment taking greater than 30 days cost $4.25M. We use these facts to t f (t) = b exp(−α/t 2 ), the cost in $M of a breach given discovery and containment occurred at t days. As no statistics are given about the distribution of time to discovery, we use the given average, 197 days as a default detection time in our calculations. From the statement that containment taking greater than 30 days cost $4.25M we obtain
For large t, f (t) ≈ b, hence the limit on the le approaches b, giving b =$4.25M. Next, from the second piece of data we have
Numerically solving gives α ≈ 12007.3. Altogether our ed S-curve breach cost model is f (t) = 4.25 exp(−12007.3/t 2 ). See Figure 4 . Fig. 4 . Plot of f (t) = 4.25 exp(−12007.3/t 2 ), the S-curve estimate of a ack cost given assumptions derived from Ponemon's 2018 data [30] .
Further examples of a ack cost estimates are given in Section 4.1.
Resource costs.
Many of the resource costs described in Section 3.2.2 involve datacenter and hosting costs. If these are unknown for a particular organization, calculating pricing based on cloud hosting provides a real-world default for these costs. ese costs are readily available from cloud hosting providers such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) 7 .
As shown in Table 3 , these costs primarily depend on the volume of data generated, and the amount of computational and memory resources needed for processing this volume of data. Table  3 only includes AWS bandwidth costs, which does not charge for uploading data to their cloud services. is does not include any costs from the ISP or other bandwidth costs. Of course in a real-world scenario, a price for uploading data would be incurred, although not by AWS, but through bills for internet service, power, etc. is also assumes no so ware licensing costs-some licenses, such as Splunk (h ps://www.splunk.com) a popular SIEM system, can signi cantly increase in cost based on data volume.
As noted in an earlier study of SOCs [7] : Reported size of host data varied widely … On the low end an approximation of 300MB/day were given. One respondent works across many organizations and reported 100GB to 10TB per day, with the la er the largest estimate given during our surveys … Overall, Splunk subscription costs were cited directly by some as the constraint for data collection a er mentioning they would bene t from more data collection. Perhaps this is unsurprising given estimates from the numbers above-the sheer quantity of host data collected and available to security operator centers is between 1GB-1TB/day, stored for 3 months ≈ 100days = 100GB-100TB. Combining the gures in the quote above with the costs from Table 3 results in baseline storage costs ranging from $10 to $10,000 per month; this shows that even though storage and bandwidth costs are very low per unit, they can be substantial across a large organization depending on what sources are collected. Table of estimated resource costs, assuming and only taking into account cloud hosting fees. is is calculated assuming long-term use of reserved t3.large AWS instances with EBS SSD at current (2018) prices. For real-world scenarios C B R Bandwidth would include prices for internet service, etc, and subscriptions depending on data volume (e.g. Splunk SIEM tool) fees would need to be added.
Estimates of Labor costs.
Some estimates place an average analyst salary at around $75k to $80k per year 8 (about $35 to $38 per hour). is gure does not include bene ts, which generally make up 30 or 40 percent of total compensation 9 , does not include any bonuses or other non-salary compensation, and does not include any overhead costs. In the absence of any more detailed information, an estimate of $70 per hour may currently be a reasonable starting point when including bene ts and allowing some padding for other overhead. 
Analysts Our interaction with SOC operators indicates that tens of thousands of alerts per month are automatically handled (e.g., AV ring and quarantining a le), but a much smaller minority require manual investigation, usually tracked through a ticketing system. A typical ticketed alert requires several minutes to triage by tier 1 analysts, and if escalated can require hours (or potentially days) to fully investigate and remediate according to some published sources [52, 59] . Our interaction with SOC operators con rmed that tier 1 analysts spend 10 minutes per ticketed alert, that tier 2 analysts use up to 2 hours, and tier 3 analysts time is potentially unbounded. If we assume that 50% of alerts can be triaged and resolved by tier 1 analysts 10 , in an average of 10 minutes, and that additional investigation by higher tiers takes an average of 2 hours, that means an average alert would cost approximately 10 minutes at $70/hr ($11.67) + 50% × 2 hours × $70/hr ($70), or about $80 in total.
A er triage is, the incident response begins, i.e., handling cleanup, mitigation, and related tasks a er an a ack. Section 3.2.1 proposes an S curve of increasing cost over time, and with some information on costs of incident clean up one could t an S curve similar to the example in Section 3.4.1. For a simpler model, if we assume an average of 6 hours for incident response at $70/hr, we obtain a cost of $420 or about $400.
EXAMPLES
Here we provide speci c examples of the using the framework. e rst example explains estimates and con guration of the framework for an upcoming IARPA grand challenge, a cyber competition and the target application driving this research. Secondly, we evaluate a detection algorithm proposed in our previous work as though it was to be deployed. e second application gives examples of how the evaluation framework is useful from the point of view of the researcher in developing novel tools/algorithms, from the SOC in considering purchase of a new tool, and from a vendor deciding the worth of their product.
VirtUE Contegrity Breach Detection Challenge
A target application of this framework is evaluating detection capabilities for a competition as part of the IARPA VirtUE (Virtuous User Environment) research and development (R&D) program 11 .
e VirtUE R&D program is developing a computing environment where each of a user's daily computing roles occupies its own isolated virtual environment (a Virtue) without signi cant impact on the functionality to a user, e.g., a separate Docker [42] container could be launched for a user's email browsing, Internet Browsing, and Sharepoint administration roles, while the user sees and interacts with a single uni ed desktop presenting all these roles. Building isolated virtual environments speci cally for constrained, well-de ned user roles creates enhanced opportunities to sense and protect those environments. VirtUE hopes to contrast this with the traditional user interface model where all user roles are merged indistinguishably into one single shared memory environment.
In the VirtUE Contegrity Challenge, competitors are tasked with accurately identifying a acks on con dentiality and integrity (contegrity) as e ciently as possible. Speci cally, the competitors will employ their detection analytics to analyze the security logs of six di erent role-speci c Virtues.
Competitors will be tasked with minimizing the total amount of log data that their analytics process while accurately detecting the presence of contegrity a acks on a Virtue. Each Virtue will experience zero to two a acks over a time period of an hour for a total of 12 possible a acks.
e a acks fall into 16 categories (e.g., "Capturing or transporting encryption keys", "Corrupting output of a computation"), and performers must identify the class of the a ack with each alert. Alerts with the wrong classi cation are considered a false positive.
Competition Scoring
Model. e goal of this section is to produce a scoring procedure that
• rewards accuracy of the detector, • rewards timeliness of detection, • penalizes performers for bandwidth, processing, memory, and storage use, • and is practical to compute for evaluating such a competition.
In short, the scoring should take into account the accuracy, timeliness, and resource requirements of the detection capability. We leverage the model above to determine a "cost of security" score for each participant's detector and the detector incurring the lowest cost wins.
To model the a acks, we assign a total value of the data each Virtue contains, and this provides the asymptote (b) for the S-curve model as described in Section 3.1.1. Consulting Ponemon's 2018 report [30] , the average cost per client record a ected in a breach was $148 in 2018. (We note that Ponemon's report focused on stolen customer data, which may not be an accurate estimate for enterprise data.) Assuming 100 les per Virtue furnishes b = $14,800. To accommodate the 1-hour competition duration, we choose the time parameter, α, so that 50% of the maximum possible cost, b, is obtained in 5 minutes. us, α = 25 log(2). Note that while we model integrity a acks with equal cost as con dentiality costs, in an alternate scenario, one may adjust the integrity model to incur greater cost than con dentiality a acks following the assumption that usually the adversary has access to but also corrupts data in the former, while only has access in the la er. Altogether, our competition's model for the cost of an integrity a ack (in thousands of dollars) t minutes a er initiation is
See Figure 5 . Finally, for each a ack administered in the competition, we charge the participant f (t d ) thousand dollars, where t d is the a ack duration lasting from the start time of the a ack to either the time of correct detection or the end of the 1-hour competition. Note that since f is increasing, this rewards early detection over later.
For labor and resource costs, we follow Section 3.4, namely Tables 3 and 4 , with some tweaks. As the goal is to evaluate the e cacy of the detection algorithms, we can ignore licensing and con guration costs for the detection so ware (C I R = $0, C I L = $0), which is equivalent to assuming each competitor's so ware incurs the same licensing and con guration costs, as well as baseline labor costs (C B L = $0) and resources needed for incident response (C I R R = $0). Competing detection capabilities will be furnished a uniform CPU and memory platform, hence CPU and memory costs can be ignored.
As explained in Section 3.4.2 every alert will cost $80 to triage, regardless of whether the alert is a true positive or false positive. If the alert is a true positive, the a ack is considered detected and remediated, and ceases to accrue cost; however, a xed $400 fee is incurred to represent the cost of this remediation.
Ongoing resource costs for use (C B R ) and triage costs (C T R ) will be traceable during the competition. To estimate these costs, we monitor the volume of data sent in or out of the detector's analytic environment and charge a single per-volume rate of $150/MB to account for any bandwidth, storage, or per-volume subscription fees (e.g., SIEMs). Just as the expected number and time-duration of a acks (and therefore alert costs) are condensed to accommodate the 1-hour duration, we in ated the estimated data costs to make it comparable to the a ack and alert costs expected.
Here we itemize this estimate. SOCs generally store logs and alerts for at least a year (e.g., see [7] ). is requires movement of data to a datastore, storage fees for a year, and SIEM fees. We estimate bandwidth costs at $1/GB based on the low estimate of $0.09 cloud bandwidth fees (Table  3 ) and high estimates from mobile networks (e.g., needed by shipping vessels and deployed military units) that can cost $10-$15/GB. For 1 year of storage we consult the cloud costs in Table 3 and obtain $0.10/GB/month ×12 months = $1.20/GB for 1 year of storage. For storage and management so ware price, we reference Splunk, costing $150 / GB / month. 12 Our estimate is $150 / GB / month × (1/730.5) month / hour = $0.20 / GB / hour for the portion of the SIEM fee incurred in this 1-hour competition. Altogether, a reasonable estimate for data moved in or out of the detector's environment is $3.40/GB, comprised of: $1/GB for the observed data movement, another $1/GB assuming a copy of it is sent to long term storage, $1.20/GB for storage fees, and $0.20/GB for SIEM fees. Finally, we need to scale this price to be comparable to the condensed a ack costs in the hour. e a ack volume is on the order of the number of a acks expected of a single host in perhaps a calendar year, yet the competition involves only about a h of the Virtues needed for a single virtual host. Consequently, to make the data costs comparable to the a ack and alert 12 Price from h ps://www.splunk.com/en us/so ware/pricing.html as of 09/25/2018.
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Iannacone, Bridges, & Long triage/remediation costs, we multiply by 5 × 24 hours/day × 365 days/year, giving $148.92/MB. For simplicity we use $150/MB in the competition.
Altogether, the scoring evaluation is as follows:
• When the competition starts, the system is in a true negative state, and only the bandwidth/storage used by the detector will be accruing costs. Total volume of data used by the detector's virtual environment will incur a fee of $150/MB.
• Every time an alert is given a $80 fee will be charged for triage.
• For every true positive alert, an additional $400 fee will be charged to represent the cost of remediating the a ack.
• Once an a ack is detected, ∆t d , the time from the start of the a ack until detection, is determined. e a ack is considered ended and f (∆t d ) thousand dollars is charged.
• Finally, at the end of the competition, for any ongoing (undetected) a acks their duration (from start of the a ack until the end of the competition) ∆t d is determined. For each, f (∆t d ) thousand dollars is charged.
Testing the Virtue IDS Evaluation Framework:
Simulations & Baselines. Importantly, we seek con rmation that the scoring procedure does indeed reward a balance of accuracy, timeliness, and preservation of resources. To investigate, we simulate some a ack scenarios and defense schemes and present the results. We create four separate scenarios with number of a acks, n a =0, 4, 8, and 12, and the n a a acks occurring at randomly sampled times (rounded to nearest two minutes) in the hour with replacement.
Our detection models are as follows:
• Null detector -is detector simulates having no security measures. It uses no data, throws no alerts and has maximum time to detection (60m -a ack start time).
• Periodic hunting (10m) -is detector and the one below simulates a full system check at preset intervals without continually monitoring any data. We assume it will detect any ongoing a acks in each scan but will also incur many false positives by issuing all 16 alerts at 10m, 20m, …, 50m. Data cost is $0 as it does not monitor hosts.
• Periodic hunting (30m) -Same as above but with only two scans at 15m and 45m.
• Low-data, low-speed detector -is and the detectors below simulate a real-time monitoring IDS. It uses 5 MB of data (initial overhead) plus 0.1 MB per a ack; Data(n a ) = 5 + 0.1n a MB. It throws 5 alerts plus 5 per a ack; Alerts(n a ) = 5 + 5n a . (Hence we assume that with no a acks we obtain 5 false positives, and we assume that for each a ack it sends an additional 4 false alerts then the correct h alert.) It detects every a ack at 3 minutes.
• Low-data medium-speed detector -Same as the above detector, but we assume it detects every a ack at 1.5m.
• High-data medium-speed detector -It uses 10 MB of data plus 1 MB per a ack; Data(n a ) = 10 + n a MB. It throws 4 alerts plus 4 per a ack; Alerts(n a ) = 4 + 4n a . It detects every a ack at 1.5m.
• High-data high-speed detector -Same as above but it detects every a ack at 15s.
Results are displayed in Figure 6 giving the average cost incurred by each simulated detector over 1000 runs in each a acks scenario (0, 4, 8, 12 a acks). As expected, the Null Detector (no security measures) incurs no cost if there is no a ack, but averages wildly high a ack costs in the a ack scenarios. Periodic hunting for threats incurs a large cost during the investigations, but strictly limits the a ack costs. Performing the scans for a acks every 10m vastly outperforms periodic hunting on 30m intervals when a acks are present. We see a dramatic drop in costs across all scenarios with a acks when even real-time monitoring is assumed (last four detectors) even with only approximately 1 true alert in 5 was assumed. See the bo om bar chart for a zoom-in on the three best simulated detectors. First note that decreasing time to detection in both the low-data and high-data detectors also decreases costs, as desired. Further, as these four models increase linearly with the number of a acks, simply looking at the 12-a ack scenario su ces. Next, note that the overall best performance is by the low-data, medium-speed detector, which takes 1m to identify an a ack ($11,010 for 12-a ack scenario). We note that while the high-data, high-speed detector detects a acks six-times faster, its use of data increases its cost ($12,260 for 12-a ack scenario), but it is still slightly be er than the high-data medium-speed detector ($12,340 for 12-a ack scenario) as expected. ese nearly identical costs for the two high-speed detectors imply that detection within the rst minute or so of an a ack e ectively prevents the a ack; hence, it is not worth the data costs to increase time to detection in this case.
Overall, these are comforting results because they suggest that simple heuristics for sending alerts without actually monitoring activity will incur too large a penalty in terms of false positive costs and a ack costs to be as e ective as intelligent monitoring. Further, this shows that cost model requires a balance of data use, accuracy, and timeliness to minimize costs.
We hope these simulations provide useful baselines for competitors. As a nal baseline, we revisit the 1/e rule of the Gordon-Loeb (GL) Model 2.3.4, which states that the optimal cost of security should be bounded above by the estimated loss to a acks over e. For the 12-a ack scenario, the Null detector (no security) simulated costs was $159,093. Dividing by e gives the GL upper bound for optimal security costs of $58,527. We note that both the periodic detectors are above this bound, while all four monitoring simulations are under it.
GraphPrints Evaluation Example
In this section we revisit our previous work [25] that introduced GraphPrints, a graph-analytic network-level anomaly detector. Our goal is to provide an example of the evaluation framework as an alternative to the usual true-positive/false-positive analysis given in the original paper and commonly used for such research works. Additionally, the example illustrates how the cost-bene t analysis can bene t (1) the researchers evaluation of a new technology, (2) SOC operators from the perspective of considering adoption as if GraphPrints were a viable commercial o -the-shelf technology and (3) from the point of view of a vendor deciding on the price of such a product.
GraphPrints Overview.
GraphPrints algorithm processes network ow data 13 . e algorithm builds a directed graph from a time slice (e.g., 30s.) of ows. e graph's nodes represent IPs and directed, colored edges represent connections with port information.
Graph-level detection: For each graph the number of graphlets-small, node-induced sub-graphsare counted. is gives a feature vector encoding the local topology of the communications in that time window. A streaming anomaly detection algorithm is performed on the sequence of graphlet vectors. Speci cally, a multivariate gaussian distribution is t to the history of observed vectors, and new graphlet vectors with a su ciently low p-value (equiv. high mahalanobis distance) are detected as anomalous. Finally, the newly scored vector is added to the history of observations, and the process repeats upon receipt of the next vector. is provides an anomaly detector for the whole IP space represented by the graph. We note that the original GraphPrints paper [25] also describes a related, node-level detector (following Bridges et al. [6] ), but for the sake of clarity, we provide the evaluation for only the network-level technology.
GraphPrints Evaluation.
For testing in the original paper [25] , real network ow data was implanted with bi orrent tra c as a surrogate for an a ack. As torrenting was against policy it indeed constituted anomalous tra c. Secondly, it was chosen as bi orrent tra c appears as an internal IP contacting many external, abnormal IPs and moving data, potentially similar to malware beaconing or data ex ltration.
e initial evaluation sought to show the existence of a window of thresholds for the detector that gave "good" true/false positive balance. See Figure 7 . At the network level with the depicted threshold the test exhibited perfect true positive rate and 2.84% false positive rate. We manually investigated the false positives nding they were IP-scans originating from internal hosts assigned to the company's IT sta . Presumably this was legitimate activity causing false positives, e.g., a vulnerability or asset scanning appliance.
We provide an instantiation of our evaluation framework as a more informative alternative to the true/false positive analysis of the detection capability. To estimate the initial resource cost, C I R , the cost of necessary hardware is tallied. Based on preliminary testing we conducted, to run the algorithm in real time a separate instance should be used to model roughly 2,500 IPs. at is, we expect a large network to be divided into subnets with separate GraphPrints instances per subnet, e.g., an operation w/ 10,000 IPs would require n = 10, 000/2, 500 = 4 GraphPrints servers. Since all costs except the initial subscription will scale by n we neglect this factor in the analysis and note that the nal gures grow linearly with the network size. We contacted a few SOCs regarding server speci cations for such a technology, and they pointed us to inkmate HPC 14 and Cisco UCS C220 M4 rack server 15 costing approximately between $2K to $15K depending on con guration options. Additionally they mentioned adding 15% for un-included hardware, e.g., racks, cords, etc. Most so ware used is opensource (e.g., Linux OS). Altogether, we estimate C I R = $7, 500 × (1.15) = $8, 625 per instance. Additionally, the initial labor costs to con gure the servers we estimate at one day giving C I L = $70/hour hours = $560, following rates estimated in Section 3.4.3. For C B R we assume the operation already collects and stores network ows, so adding this technology will add only alerts to the storage costs, and will add ows and alerts to the bandwidth cost, as alerts are sent to the SIEM and ows must be sent from the ow sensor to the GraphPrints server. For storage costs, if we assume 500KB/month/server, estimates in Table 3 give 500 × 10 −6 GB/month ×$0.10/GB = $5 × 10 −5 /month. Since this is a negligible amount of money, we ignore this term in the estimate. For bandwidth costs, assuming $0.10/GB, a low-end estimate for data transfer since it is internal, we estimate about 15GB of ows are produced per subnet per month, giving $1.5/month. is is again, a negligible amount comparatively, so we ignore C B R .
We estimate that each instance of GraphPrints will require weekly recon guration, e.g., threshold adjustment or a heuristic implemented to reduce false positives, and we allocate 1 person hour per week per instance. From estimates in Section 3.4.3, C B L =$70 / week × 4 weeks / month = $280 / month.
For triage and incident response costs, we reuse the estimates from the VirtUE challenge above; namely, we assume a at average of $80 per false positive, and $480 per true positive. Similarly, for breach costs we use the S curve fron the VirtUE challenge given in Equation 9 . Given the results above ( Figure 7) we assume a perfect true positive rate with near immediate detection (assume, containment within 1 minute response time), and a 2.84% false positive rate. For each GraphPrints instance, a scored event occurs every 30s time window giving 86,400 events × 2.84% = 2,454 false positives per month, accruing 2,454 × $80 = $196,320/month. If we assume each instance incurs one a acks per month, then a 1-minute response time gives response + a ack costs of $480 + f (1) = $480 / month (a ack costs are negligible with fast detection).
Altogether, the cost of adopting this technology, neglecting licensing or subscription fees is estimated as an initial one-time resource and con guration fee of $8,625+560 = $ 9,185 and a ongoing monthly cost of $ (196,320 + 2,400 + 280) = $199,000 per instance! To put this gure in perspective, we consider two alternatives-the estimate without adopting the technology and the estimate assuming recon guration addresses the false positives.
Without this technology, if the lone a ack per required 10m for detection and containment, then our cost estimate is simply $480 +f (10) / month / instance = $12,905 / month / instance. Applying the GL 1/e rule of thumb, we see optimal security costs should be below $12,905/e = $4,747 per month per instance or $56970 per year per instance.
In the more interesting recon guration scenario, we note that the false positives found in testing were occurring from legitimate network scanning appliances tripping the GraphPrints detector. Common practice for handling such false positives involves continually tuning tools [7, 52] . As we included the labor costs for monthly recon guration, it is reasonable to assume that each such false positive would occur one time, then recon guration would prevent the same alert. In this case, the there would be only the lone, rst false positives in the testing window (Figure 7 ), so our false positive rate drops to 0.56%. With this false positive rate, we incur 86,400 events × 0.56% = 14 false positives per month per instance, for a cost of 14 × $80 = $1,120. Now the cost for adopting the GraphPrints technology is the initial $9,185 server cost plus $ (1,120 + 2,400 + 280) = $3,800/month/instance. We note that this is indeed below the GL upper bound. Neglecting initial costs, the technology promises a yearly savings to customers of 12 months × $(12,905 -$3,800)/month = $109,260. With the initial costs for hardware and con guration included, we see operations will save about $100,000 / year.
From the point of a researcher, such an analysis is enlightening, as it allows quantitative reasoning about the impact of the true/false positive analysis and resource requirements. Further, it gives a single metric to optimize when, for example, deciding a threshold for detection. From a SOC's perspective, provided the numbers above are reasonable estimates, the conclusion is clear-if false positives can be mostly eliminated with one-o recon guration tuning, then this is a good investment; if not, then this is a terrible investment. We recommend a testing period to give a much more informed decision on both the gures estimated above and the nal decision. Finally, from the perspective of the vendor, such an estimate can help dial in their yearly subscription fees. Yearly cost to use this technology are $9,185 (server cost) +12 × 3, 800 = $54,785 plus subscription fees. If a subscription is required per instance (scales with n), then annual subscription cost can be bounded above by the GL bound minus the operational costs, that is, they should be less than $56,970 -54,785 = $2,185 to keep total costs under the GL rule of thumb.
CONCLUSION
Useful security metrics are important for estimating the e cacy of new products or new technologies, important for evaluating red team or competition events, and important for organizations which must weigh the cost verses bene t of security practices. As we have described, each of those three areas have developed their own generally accepted metrics within their topic areas, but these have been focused too narrowly, and cannot easily be applied from one area to another, For example, it is currently di cult to take the statistical metrics from researcher testing of an IDS and estimate the impact on a speci c organization. In this paper, we have proposed a holistic approach, which generalizes and combines the traditional metrics in these areas in a exible framework by comprehensively modeling the various costs involved. is provides a con gurable cost model that balances accuracy, timeliness, and resource use. Moreover, it is easy to interpret and analyze. To illustrate the e cacy of the new model, we tune it to be used as the scoring procedure for an upcoming IARPA IDS competition, and use simulated a ack/defense scenarios to test the e cacy of the cost framework. Our results support that a balance of accuracy, response time, and resource use are promoted by the model. Finally, we exhibit the use of this new model to evaluate a new security tool from multiple points of view, speci cally the researcher, the SOC (client), and the vendor. Our results show the model can provide clear and actionable insights from each.
